

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT

SUBJECT Personnel Reductions in the Soviet Army

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REFERENCES

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SOURCE: Source, believed to be reliable

The source of this report is the same as the one in referenced reports. Para. 1-4 contain source's personal comments on the information in the referenced reports. The information in Para. 5 of this report is from an informant who had recently returned from Austria. Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. The demobilization order which called for a 20 percent reduction in the officer strength of the Soviet Army did not specify how this reduction was to be carried out.<sup>1</sup> It is source's opinion, however, that this demobilization will be effected principally through personnel reductions in the staffs of large headquarters and through the elimination of "special units" such as construction and other engineer-type organizations.
2. The order for skeletonizing (kadriroyaniye) the Soviet Army units in the USSR, which chiefly affected enlisted men,<sup>2</sup> and the order which called for a 20 percent reduction in officer strength were two separate actions. Source believes that the personnel reductions provided for by these two orders are much less extensive than those of 1946.
3. The policy of permitting young men of military age to serve their tour of duty in military schools and then demobilizing them as junior officers in a reserve status is connected with the policy of placing senior sergeants in command of platoons.<sup>2</sup> In time of war these NCOs would be able to serve as junior officers. The high rate of attrition among company grade officers during World War II has shown the Soviets the need for a large pool of junior officers. This is even more valid in modern warfare, where even greater losses among junior officers can be expected.
4. On the other hand, a battalion commander in the Soviet Army now holds the rank and duty status equivalent to that of a regimental commander. In the event of war, however, these battalions will be expanded into regiments.
5. An informant who had been in Austria in late fall 1954 stated that units [specific units not given] in the Central Group of Forces in Austria had received new T/Os which called for reductions in personnel strength. He added that units in the

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Central Group of Forces were being brought up to T/O strength units and T/Os not specified. Informant also mentioned that the normal tour of duty in Austria had been set at five years for married officers and three years for unmarried officers.

1. See CS DB-27601
2. See CS DB-26402

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